PERAN KEPEMILIKAN INSTITUSIONAL: PENGARUH RELATED PARTY TRANSACTION TERHADAP NILAI PERUSAHAAN

Authors

  • Fitri Nurjanah Universitas Islam Lamongan
  • Rosdiyati Rosdiyati Universitas Islam Lamongan
  • Indah Kurniyawati Universitas Islam Lamongan
  • Rizqi Rahman Putra Nurdiansyah Universitas Islam Lamongan

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.34128/jra.v6i1.169

Keywords:

Related party transactions, Firm value, Institutional ownership

Abstract

The aim of this study is to prove the effect of related party transactions on firm value with the moderation of institutional ownership. The data analysis method used are descriptive statistics and hypothesis testing using the Moderated Regression on Analysis (MRA) methods and the Stata 14 application. The population in this study are all non-financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2017-2020. This study used a total sample of 363 companies. The results show that related-party transactions harm firm value that can raise concerns of minority shareholders that related-party transactions have the potential for tunelling that will harm them as minority shareholders. That causes capital market investors to react negatively to the company, thereby reducing the value of the company. Institutional ownership moderates the effect of related party transactions on firm value.

 

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Published

2023-06-18

Issue

Vol. 6 No. 1 (2023): Jurnal Riset Akuntansi Politala

Section

Articles

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